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1. Introduction  
 
Agriculture contributes negative and positive externalities to society, that is, beneficial and 
detrimental changes in human wellbeing to third parties for which they are not generally 
compensated or charged. Beneficial externalities include the creation of amenity and landscape 
and negative externalities include pollution of surface and groundwater. In so far as parts of 
agricultural subsidies compensate for beneficial externalities, they are said to be 'internalised' 
and should not be the subject of further policy measures. However, agricultural subsidies also 
add to the negative externalities by expanding output and encouraging environmentally 
detrimental farming practices. Comprehensive attempts to value these externalities in the UK 
and to compare them to the true value added of the agricultural sector are to be found in 
Hartridge and Pearce (2002) and Pretty et al. (2000).  A particular feature of the negative 
externalities is the damage done by nutrient pollution and by pesticides. Nutrient pollution refers 
to water pollution mainly from nitrates and phosphorus, concentrations being elevated by 
leaching from soils of fertilisers and animal manure and slurry. A similar leaching process 
occurs with pesticides. Significant repositories for these leached pollutants are surface waters 
and groundwater. 
 
In the UK, the main source of nitrate pollution in freshwater is agriculture, with some river 
pollution being due to sewage. Sources of agricultural nitrogen are inorganic fertilisers and 
livestock manure and slurry, As far as phosphorus is concerned, sewage discharges and 
agriculture both contribute, but agriculture provides the major input from manure and slurry and 
inorganic fertilisers. Eutrophication of water results from excess nutrient loading. Eutrophication 
contributes to losses of biological diversity and nitrate concentrations in drinking water may be a 
health hazard. Notable characteristics of these sources of pollution are (a) that some of the 
manure and slurry applications to land are designed as waste disposal systems, rather than as 
intended fertiliser; and (b) the sources of the waste are dispersed or 'non-point'. The former 
characteristic raises issues of policy integration - for example, manure disposed of to land results 
from restrictions on alternative means of disposal. The second characteristic also raises a 
complex policy issue, namely how to design a system of controls for pollutants the sources of 
which are hard to identify and measure. This paper is concerned with the second issue and, in 
particular, with the extent to which market-based approaches, such as taxes, could be used to 
control non-point pollution. 
 
2. Nitrate and pesticide pollution in the UK 
 
Table 1 summarises data on nitrate, phosphorus and pesticide pollution of freshwater in the UK. 
Average concentrations of phosphorus in surface waters fluctuate considerably, but the 2000 
concentration is below that of 1980. Nitrate concentrations for surface waters have increased 
1980-2000. Pesticides in both surface water and ground water have increased when measured in 
terms of the percentage of samples about specified concentrations. (Nitrate pollution of 
groundwater is not shown in Table 1 due to an ambiguity in the units of measurement). 
Approximately 35% of English rivers (by length) contain more than 30 mgNO3/l (roughly the 
European Union standard) and 60% contain more than 0.1 mgP/l. The corresponding 
percentages for Wales are 2% and 8%, and for N.Ireland, 0% and 27%. Overall, then, nutrient 
and pesticide pollution of freshwater has not shown improvement. 
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Table 1 Freshwater pollution by nitrates, phosphorus and pesticides (Great Britain 
average). 
 
 1980 1990          1995   1999          2000 
Surface water: 
  Orthophosphates 
(mg/l(P) 
  Nitrates (mg/l(NO3) 
  Pesticides1 
  Pesticides2  
 
 
  0.40 
15.90 
 
 
 
 
  0.64           0.50 
16.20         17.40 
                    9.90 
                    3.50 
 
  0.40             0.33 
17.80           17.00 
14.80 
  3.40 
Groundwater: 
   Pesticides1 
   Pesticides2 
 
 
 
                   19.10 
                   17.30 
 
35.40 
31.60 
 
Source: www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/des/index.htm 
Notes:  1 - % of samples of Mecocrop, a typical pesticide, over 100 ng/l; 
2 - % of samples of Mecocrop over 500 ng/l. Figures for phosphates and nitrates are averages for Great 
Britain. 
 
3. The policy context: nitrates and pesticides 
 
Policy on nutrient and pesticide pollution in the UK has three central features. The first consists 
of guidance issued by DEFRA (formerly MAFF) to farmers about 'good practice' in the 
management of these pollutants. The second involves a voluntary agreement between DEFRA 
and farmers with respect to pesticides. The third involves land zoning for 'Nitrate Sensitive 
Areas' (NSAs) and Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs). For discussion purposes, the first and 
second aspects can be treated as one. 
 
 
3.1 Voluntary agreement on pesticides 
 
The current voluntary agreement on pesticides emerged from an initial proposal in 1997 by the 
Labour Government to introduce a pesticides tax. Early formulations of such a tax were 
contained in a consultant's report (ECOTEC, 1998) and the Budget in 2000 entertained the real 
possibility of such a tax. The Crop Protection Association (CPA), acting for farming interests, 
expressed their opposition to such a tax and sought its replacement with voluntary measures. 
CPA’s own April 2000 proposal for self-regulation was revised in October 2000 in response to 
Government criticism that the proposals would not be sufficiently effective. The CPA proposals 
included information programmes, promulgation of best practice on disposing of waste pesticide 
and spraying procedures, and a separate agreement with the water industry covering a limited 
number of farms in sensitive water catchment areas. The revised package was also rejected by 
the Government. A third attempt to secure a voluntary package was made in 2001. This time a 
more pro-active stance was taken on biodiversity conservation, and the package included a 
proposal for crop protection management plans, along with detailed targets for pesticide 
reduction. Significantly, the package was developed with consultation from other parties, 
including environmental bodies who had been critical of the first two packages. Implementation 
 4
                                                
would similarly be overseen by a multi-stakeholder committee. This third proposed package was 
welcomed by environmental groups. In June 2000, the then DETR commissioned a further 
consultancy report on the design of an effective voluntary agreement (EFTEC et al. 2002). This 
report commented on the likely effectiveness of the second set of CPA proposals and then set 
out its own proposals for a more effective voluntary agreement. 22 measures were proposed 
along with 85 actions, and 35 of the actions derive from the original CPA proposals. 
 
The problem with voluntary approaches is that they have a high risk of not working, or, if they 
do work, they do so at unnecessarily high compliance cost. The literature on voluntary 
agreements is now extensive – see ten Brink (2002). The identified  advantages of voluntary 
agreements can be summarized as follows:  
 
(i) regulatory costs are avoided since the industry is in a better position to judge the 
appropriate actions and adjust them flexibly and in a targeted fashion. This could be 
important in industries where profit margins are low, or competitiveness is a vital 
concern, or where incomes are threatened, as with agriculture; 
(ii) they can be devised so as to involve stakeholders, reducing the potential for conflict over 
regulation1; 
(iii) they generate better and more extensive information (learning) about environmental 
risks; 
(iv) they may be easier and faster to implement than regulations. 
 
However, there are considerable risks with voluntary agreements. These can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(i) they may not be effective because they lack mandatory targets and the credibility of the 
threat of strict regulation in such contexts may fade with time; 
(ii) they may easily be 'captured' by polluters in their own interests; 
(iii) there is a risk of free-riders if the industry agency implementing the measures does not 
have full coverage of polluters, and further free-riding may arise from parties within the 
agreement through non-compliance; 
(iv) they may be used as a barrier to new entry into the industry; 
(v) their effectiveness may be immeasurable due to the difficulties of defining the 'business 
as usual' baseline situation against which performance needs to be measured. It may 
similarly be difficult to measure performance relative to some alternative policy 
instrument. 
 
Studies of the economic efficiency (cost minimisation) and environmental effectiveness 
(whether targets are met) of voluntary agreements suggest an inconclusive picture. The 
empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical literature which shows that efficiency and 
effectiveness depends critically upon bargaining power, implicit allocations of property rights, 
the credibility and severity of the threat of alternative policy, commitment of the parties, 
stakeholder involvement and free-riding (e.g. see Segerson, 1998). The literature does suggest 
that agreements are likely to be less efficient than market-based instruments, but perhaps no 
worse in terms of environmental effectiveness. On the other hand, Dosi and Zeitouni (2000) are 
clear that existing voluntary approaches in the European Union for non-point pollution have not 
 
1 Interestingly, 'stakeholders' are usually defined in terms of those groups and institutions that can inhibit a regulation 
from being effective, whether those groups are elected or self-appointed. The general public often appears not to 
constitute a 'stakeholder group'. 
 5
brought about substantial reductions in pollution trends. The inconclusiveness of the empirical 
literature derives in part because most agreements are relatively recent, but in other cases there 
are problems of data, and of determining the baseline against which goals are to be assessed. In 
so far as the baseline can be determined, some agreements have done no better than the baseline 
and some have improved upon it. 'Soft benefits' are excluded from tests of efficiency and 
effectiveness, i.e. the extent to which agreements foster greater trust and understanding between 
stakeholders. Potentially offsetting this benefit is an analogous cost if the agreement is seen as a 
sign of 'weak' government. Probably the most useful outcome of the literature to date has been 
the development of guidelines for incentive design within agreements (e.g. EFTEC et al. 2002; 
OECD, 1999). In the event that consistent incentives could be guaranteed, then it is possible that 
voluntary agreements will perform well relative to other policy approaches.  
 
In November 2002, The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee issued a severely 
critical report on the voluntary initiative on pesticides (Environmental Audit Committee, 2002). 
They declared that the initiative lacked clear goals for reducing pesticide usage, was already a 
year behind in developing Crop Protection Management Plans, and that the actions added little 
or nothing to the baseline of what would have happened anyway given that other schemes also 
exist. They regarded the 30% take-up target for 2006 as ‘insufficiently challenging’ and that 
Government lacked criteria by which to judge whether the initiative was a success or not.  They 
doubted that the voluntary agreement contained real incentives to change farmer behaviour, and 
that DEFRA’s approach to funding a Steering Group for the initiative was ‘miserly’. Finally, the 
Committee called for more investigations into the practical design of economic instruments. The 
Committee’s conclusions very much bear out economists’ doubts about voluntary agreements. 
To be effective, they have to contain carefully targeted incentives, and the pesticides agreement 
does not contain those. 
 
3.2 Land zoning 
 
Nitrate Sensitive Areas (NSAs) were introduced in 1990 in the UK in response to the European 
Union Drinking Water Directive (80/778/EC) which set a limit on nitrate concentrations in 
drinking water of 50 mg/l-1. In NSAs, farmers are paid to adopt different land management 
schemes than those they would normally practise and which impose risks on surface and 
groundwater. Effectively, farmers are seen as possessing the property rights to traditional land 
management. Typical schemes involve converting arable land to unfertilised, ungrazed grass; 
converting to low input grass; and converting high input arable to low input arable. 
 
In 1998, a new zoning scheme set up 66 Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) in response to the EU 
Nitrate Directive of 1991 (91/676/EEC). NVZs are not solely concerned with health risks as is 
the case with NSAs, and hence the coverage is broader at some 8 per cent (600,000 ha) of 
England's land area. Farms in the NVZs are subject to controls, through an Action Programme 
on rates and timing of fertiliser application. In 2000, the European Court of Justice ruled that the 
UK was not in compliance with the Nitrate Directive and that further action was required. In 
2001 DEFRA issued a consultation document (DEFRA, 2001) setting out only two options for 
compliance with the Nitrate Directive: (a) all farms in England would be designated as being 
within NVZs, or (b) 80% of England would be classified as within NVZs while designations in 
Wales and Scotland would be far lower. The former wider coverage option is estimated to have 
compliance costs of some £36 million, the latter £27 million. Offsetting savings in terms of 
improved use of nutrients make the net costs £32 million and £23 million (DEFRA, 2001). No 
full cost-benefit study was carried out. 
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There are two basic reasons why the zoning approach is used. First, NSAs and NVZs reflect a 
'management agreement' approach to pollution control. This approach hinges critically upon the 
issue of who has the 'property rights' to agricultural land. If it is the public, then farmers should 
expect to face the implications of the 'polluter pays principle' and be regulated or taxed for 
generating negative externalities. But if the farmers have the property rights then it is for society 
to pay them not to undertake environmentally and health damaging activities. The management 
agreement approach tends to assume that farmers have the property rights, and hence they 
should be paid, at least in part, to participate in voluntary restrictions. On this basis, farmers 
inside NVZs are partially paid to comply. The payment is only partial because EU laws on State 
Aid forbid subsidies in contexts where there is a legal requirement to comply. Outside of NVZs, 
voluntary codes of good practice still apply.  
 
The second reason for adopting the zoning/voluntary code of practice approach is because the 
pollution in question is diffuse in nature. Since it is not possible directly to measure rates of 
nitrate leaching farm by farm, it is not possible to identify precisely who the polluters are. The 
management approach works by appealing to, and negotiating best practice, without the 
regulatory burdens of direct controls, which would be untargeted blunt instruments. 
 
But the problems with zoning as an efficient solution to the problem of nitrate pollution are 
several.  First, there are technical issues relating to the extent of the land to be designated as a 
NVZ. For any given site in excess of the 50 mg/l limit, areas upstream need to be designated as 
NVZs. The question is how far upstream these designations should extend. Previously, the rule 
of thumb was that the designation would extend as far as points where the threshold is not 
breached. Under the new proposals, all upstream sources would be designated NVZs regardless 
of whether they exceed the threshold or not. There is a risk in this procedure that designations 
will 'over-comply' with the requirements, adding an excess cost burden to the regulation. The 
second problem builds on this:  zoning may not be the minimum cost policy anyway, i.e. zoning 
is not being compared with alternative procedures. A third problem relates to the failure of the 
zoning policy to adopt an integrated approach. Areas with restricted nitrogen applications will 
face the potential of surplus manure stocks which will have to be transported to sites where there 
is a 'manure deficit' in the sense that manure applications to land will not exceed the nitrogen 
budget. The transportation process will itself create environmental problems, so that reduced 
nitrate in water is effectively being traded with increased noise, traffic emissions etc. In the same 
vein, many farmers accept sewage sludge for spreading on the land and it has been suggested 
that, faced with nitrogen problems, they may now refuse to allow sludge to be disposed of in this 
way. If so, this would effectively generate a further environmental problem of what to do with 
sewage sludge. A final issue is the role that can be played by any economic instrument - tax or 
tradable permit - if strict command and control standards are already in place. If zoning is 
designed to ensure that maximum permissible nitrate concentrations prevail at each site, then 
trading in nitrate 'credits' would not be permitted. Trading only works if some sources can go 
over a limit and some under. With geographically fine-tuned standards in place, there would be 
no incentive to trade. This is an instance of a more general problem of how to superimpose 
market based instruments on top of existing legislation (Pearce, 2002). 
 
In light of these problems, market-based approaches to nutrient and pesticide pollution are worth 
close investigation.  Since the Nitrate Directive is law, the UK has little option but to comply as 
best they can through the zoning procedure, but it is possible that a market-based approach could 
be integrated with some form of zoning. The essence of the market-based approaches is that they 
attempt to overcome the problem of non-point pollution by tackling the inputs directly. We first 
review the theory underlying choice of policy instrument in the non-point pollution context, and 
then look at the experience with some market-based approaches. 
 
4. The theory of non-point pollution control  
 
Pollution is essentially an economic problem. Pollution involves risks to health, nuisance, 
disamenity and loss of biological diversity. All these impacts constitute losses in human 
wellbeing and constitute ‘externalities’. There are also costs of reducing pollution, in terms of 
monitoring, treating polluted effluents, cleaning up after pollution accidents and to polluters in 
terms of forgone output or profits. These costs are not equally borne by those affected, largely 
because pollution affects different individuals and groups in different ways. Pollution control is, 
thus, also a matter of equity and social justice as well as economic efficiency. The private costs 
of an activity, such as applying a fertiliser, are those incurred by the farmer. To these may then 
be added the total of external costs that occur because of the activity, for example the extra costs 
to water consumers and any costs of ill health. This results in the true inclusive social cost of the 
activity. The consequences are illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The impact of the inclusion of social costs of fertiliser use on the supply and 
demand relationship. 
S  
Private supply 
curve of industry 
D  
Demand for fertilisers 
Represents social 
loss associated 
with applying too 
much fertiliser
                                       N*     N                                                               Fertiliser Quantity 
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Line S represents a private supply curve of the fertiliser industry, and line D the demand for 
fertilisers from farmers. At price P the industry sells N amount of fertiliser – the supply is equal 
to the demand. But if external costs are added to produce a true social cost the price at any given 
quantity will increase. The new supply curve is then S΄ and the socially desirable outcome is 
now N*, where the demand corresponds to the social, not private, costs. The difference between 
N* and N represents the excess of fertiliser used because the current market price, P, does not 
account for the external costs of fertiliser pollution.  
 
There are several market-based approaches that have the potential to address agricultural 
pollution. An indirect method is persuasion combined with technical assistance to facilitate 
changes in behaviour. A more direct stimulus is setting product, design or environmental 
performance standards to which farmers must comply. The aim is to affect farmers’ choices of 
inputs and production and pollution control practices towards the socially optimal ones. An 
example of such direct regulation is pesticide registration, which restricts pesticides available to 
farmers and sets conditions of use. 
 
Alternatively, farmers’ behaviour can be influenced through the use of economic incentives. 
Major options are taxes or liability for damages to discourage environmentally harmful 
activities, subsidies to encourage pro-environment behaviour, tradable permits to ration 
environmentally harmful activities, and contracts in which environmental authorities purchase 
specified pro-environmental actions (‘paying for ecological services’). 
 
4.1 Input tax/subsidy compared to run-off tax/subsidy and ambient tax/subsidy schemes 
 
A number of hydrological process and statistical models have been developed in order to 
overcome the difficulty of measuring pollution flows from non-point sources. These can provide 
the policy maker with information on the relationship between production choices and 
emissions, which can be used to construct the economically efficient input tax/subsidy scheme. 
We briefly describe Griffin and Bromley’s (1983) model, which can be used to design optimal 
instruments, based on estimated emissions and input use. In this model polluters are risk-neutral, 
profit maximizers, and cannot collectively influence input and output prices. The objective of 
the policy-maker, as indicated in Figure 1, is to minimize the social costs of pollution (i.e. the 
sum of private costs and external costs), or equivalently to maximize the difference between the 
expected benefits of polluting activities and the expected costs of the resulting pollution. Net 
social benefits to be maximized are given in the equation below: 
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presents  watershed characteristics and parameters; and W(a) is the performance measure re
indicating a target (T) defining the maximum level of acceptable ambient degradation. 
 
The solution of this problem requires that two conditions be satisfied:2,3 (a) the marginal gain in 
profits from the use of any input on any farm must equal the marginal environmental 
opportunity costs; and (b) the marginal gain in profits from emissions must equal the marginal 
external cost of emissions. Given the externality problem described in Figure 1, condition 2 will 
not be satisfied without intervention. If input-based tax instruments are used, then farmers will 
maximize after-tax profits by equating marginal gain in pre-tax profits from the use of each 
input with the corresponding input tax rates, ijijNi x τπ =∂∂ / .4 If a farm-specific tax-based 
estimated runoff is used as an instrument ll maximize after-tax profits by 
quating the marginal gains in pre-tax profits from put, with the marginal cost of 
, then farmers wi
 the use of the ine
the increased tax payment, ijijijNi xrx ∂∂=∂∂ // τπ .5 
 
The literature on non-point agricultural pollution sources recognises, although rarely 
develops relevant applied models, that some additional parameters should be taken into 
account when constructing economic instruments for agricultural non-point pollution. These 
include: (a) the stochastic nature of emissions and imperfect information about the fate and 
ansport of pollutants and (b) asymmetry of information between the regulatory agency and 
                                                
tr
polluters about polluters’ control costs.  
 
In effect, the case-specific importance of these parameters indicates the most cost efficient 
instrument to be used in each particular situation.6 In a deterministic model the choice of base is 
unimportant (Griffin and Bromley, 1983). This does not hold when runoff is stochastic (Shortle 
and Dunn, 1986). In particular, both input-based instruments, as well as instruments based on 
estimated run-off, provide farmers with incentives to consider how their choices affect their 
expected profit and will lead farmers, as already indicated above, to the maximization of after-
tax profit. However, input choices do not only alter expected profits. They also affect the 
variance and skewness of profit. The variance of profit is directly proportional to the Arrow-
Pratt measure of risk aversion, while the skewness of profit is directly proportional to the 
measure of downside risk aversion. Both these measures of the Arrow-Pratt and downside risk 
aversion are used in the calculation of the risk premium. That is, if the farmer is risk averse, this 
premium corresponds to the percentage of his/her profit the farmer is willing to forgo (pay) in 
order to avoid the risk emerging from the use of each particular input in his/her production. 
 
2 Although the static analysis to follow offers many insights relevant for the dynamic case, additional policy 
implications can come from a dynamic analysis, with the most significant being how policies optimally evolve over 
time to ensure cost-effective rates of investment in pollution control equipment and environmental improvements 
(see, Xepapadeas, 1991, 1992, 1994; Kim et al. , 1993; Dosi and Moretto, 1993, 1994; Tomasi et al., 1994).  
3 For the sake of simplicity our analysis does not consider entry/exit effects of policy instruments. However, since 
these policy instruments affect producers’ profits they subsequently affect their decision to remain, enter or exit the 
regulated market. These considerations entail additional instruments that are designed to influence entry and exit 
without distorting input choices; e.g. a lump-sum tax to the extra-marginal producers (which ensures that they are 
better-off when they do not produce) and a lump-sum subsidy to the marginal producer whose decision to produce is 
adversely influenced by the magnitude of cost-effective taxes. 
4 Alternatively, the cost-effective allocation may be attained using farm-specific input standards that limit the use of 
pollution-increasing inputs to no more than their optimal levels and require the use of pollution-control inputs at no 
less than their optimal levels. 
5 Alternatively, for an estimated runoff standard, farms maximise profit subject to estimated runoff being restricted at 
or below a target level. 
6 Given restricted information on costs and benefits from environmental quality degradation, cost-effectiveness is the 
popular criterion adopted in instrument design. 
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ever, this is a real world aspect of the problem at hand, 
hich should be taken into account if intelligent agricultural policy is to be designed and 
ver, estimated runoff instruments have the advantage of 
ansmitting more site-specific information to producers about their environmental pressures, 
re, there is little empirical literature on the performance of 
lternative agricultural pollution control instruments under conditions of public uncertainty 
 exit); and (2) if point sources exist in the relevant region, they 
ptimally co-ordinate control of point and agricultural sources without the need to devise 
nt taxes are more effective when applied to small 
d well-monitored watersheds, with homogeneous farms and small time lags between 
polluting activity and degradation impacts. 
Hence, although input-based and estimated run-off based instruments are potentially able to 
achieve the optimal use of agricultural inputs in a deterministic framework, that cannot do so in 
a stochastic framework as they cannot capture higher moments of profits which are affected by 
input choice and also affect the welfare (utility) of risk-averse farmers operating in a 
uncertain/stochastic framework. How
w
implement (see Groom et al., 2002).  
 
Another important difference between input-based instruments and estimated runoff-based 
instruments - also related to the issue of stochasticity and imperfect information about the fate 
and transport of pollutants - is that the former allow for differential targeting of inputs 
whereas the latter do not. Differential targeting of inputs enables better fine tuning of input 
risk effects. On the other hand, howe
tr
relative to input-based instruments.  
 
When asymmetry of information between the regulatory agency and polluters about 
polluters’ control costs exists, producer responses to various instruments cannot be predicted 
accurately. As a result, it becomes impossible to design tax/subsidy incentives that will 
exactly satisfy the optimal solution of the externality problem. Although input tax/subsidy 
schemes and contractual arrangements that can elicit farmers’ specialised knowledge have 
been described in the literatu
a
about polluters’ control costs. 
 
Ambient tax/subsidy schemes involve paying farm-specific subsidies when the ambient 
pollution concentration falls below a target and charges firm-specific taxes when the ambient 
concentration exceeds the target. These schemes shift monitoring from the source of emission 
to the receptor. The same problems that limit the cost-effectiveness of estimated runoff-based 
incentives limit the cost-effectiveness of ambient-based incentives (Horan et al., 1998). 
Ambient tax schemes, however, have substantial appeal compared with input tax schemes as: 
(1) they do not need to devise farm-specific policies (except from the lump-sum charges to 
induce optimal entry and
o
source-specific policies.  
 
Additional limitations on the effectiveness of ambient taxes are introduced by the following 
factors. First, strategic considerations complicate the design of these instruments as rewards 
and penalties depend on groups’ performance. Secondly, the shift of the burden of 
information from regulators to producers might not be optimal given the limited technical 
information and capacity of the typical producer. This is again a problem relevant to 
imperfect and asymmetric information. Thirdly, ambient taxes cannot produce a first-best 
outcome when polluters are risk-averse (Horan et al., 1999). Such considerations have led 
Weersink et al. (1998) to suggest that ambie
an
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liability rules concern 
egligence: polluters are only liable if they fail to act with the ‘due standard of care’ (Segerson, 
n 
d Shortle (2001), liability rules are probably best suited to the control of pollution related to 
 non-frequent occurrences such as accidental chemical spills.  
esult 
mit less (more). The end result is that the maximum total allowable level of pollution is met at 
iciency  (transactions cost aside) than 
missions-for-estimated loadings trading-schemes because they are better able to manage the 
4.2 Liability rules 
 
Under liability rules, victims of externalities have the right to sue for damages in a court of law. 
There exist two important classes of liability rules. The first one is the strict liability rule, under 
which polluters are held liable for full payment of any damages that occur. Strict liability rules 
are similar to (non-linear) ambient taxes. The extent of a farmer’s liability depends on the 
damages that arise as a result of ambient pollution level (which is a function of site-specific 
characteristics, e.g. soil type and topography) and his beliefs regarding the probability that he 
will be sued (which itself depends on site-specific characteristics and a vector of random 
variables that may influence this probability). The second set of 
n
1995). This standard is defined in terms of either damages or input use.  
 
As far as economic performance is concerned, both strict liability and negligence are limited in 
all the ways in which ambient-based incentives are. Moreover, uncertainty about the success of 
the litigation process (depending on the characteristics of agricultural pollution), together with 
the high expenses involved, reduces the effectiveness of this instrument. As argued by Hora
an
the use of hazardous materials or
   
4.3 Point / non-point trading 
 
The main attraction of trading schemes is their potential to achieve the environmental goal at a 
lower social cost than ‘command and control’ instruments. These schemes involve each polluter 
receiving a number of pollution permits that specify allowable emissions for the permit owner. 
Permits are transferable and can be traded among owners; thus a market for pollution is created 
and relevant property rights are introduced. Farmers with high (low) marginal pollution control 
costs will purchase (sell) permits from farmers with low (high) marginal costs and as a r
e
lower cost than if trading was not allowed (Baumol and Oates, 1988; Handley et al., 1997). 
 
This is the textbook version of trading schemes. Unfortunately the reality for non-point 
emissions is not that straightforward. The difficulty in accurately monitoring them (at reasonable 
cost) and their stochastic nature complicates the design of the appropriate trading schemes for 
non-pollution in agriculture. Point / non- point systems that have been developed to date involve 
point sources trading increases in emissions for reductions in estimated loadings from non-point 
sources. Point sources are given (auctioned or purchase) the permits and agricultural non-point 
sources voluntarily enter the commitment to ‘sell’ additional allowances of permits to point 
sources (in actuality to be compensated for their reduction in loadings). As a result some control 
responsibility is transferred to non-point sources as well. Alternatives to trading mean loadings 
are trading inputs that are correlated with pollution flows, trading reductions of cropland in 
fertilisers-intensive uses. Theoretical research has demonstrated that emissions-for-inputs trading 
systems can be designed to provide greater economic eff
e
variability of non-point loads (Horan and Shortle, 2001).  
 
Another relevant issue in the design of trading schemes is the rate at which non-point allowances 
are traded for point source allowances (Shortle, 1987). This rate should not be one to one as non-
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nsored by 
e government or another broker in conjunction with point sources who wishes to purchase and 
anagement on their own, and would still provide an 
centive for farmers who had not yet made the change It would have the disadvantage, 
igation. Some farmers 
ith high costs or high-valued crops who wished to continue their current practices could 
uivalent to that from a point source. 
herefore, it is important that water quality is monitored to make sure that expected 
                                                
point inputs and estimated loadings are imperfect substitutes for point source emissions; rather 
the rate should be a function of risk and relative contributions to ambient pollution. Faeth 
(2000), the last volume of an interesting series aiming at providing answers to the mandates of 
the 1972 US Clean Water Act,7 argues in favour of a program where point-point and point/non-
point trading would have a shared responsibility to undertake remediation actions not coupled to 
point source regulatory requirements. This, he argues could take one of several forms. A first 
option could be that agricultural conservation subsidies, or some share of them, could become 
part of the pool of funds available for a joint trading program. Farmers, municipalities or 
industrial sources who generated credits could sell them through a single program spo
th
apply credits. Credits purchased by government conservation funds would be retired. 
 
As a second option, farmers could only generate credits after they have met a minimum standard 
for agricultural practices. For example, farmers who currently had sound manure management 
practices that were below standards to ones well above standard could generate a partial credit. 
While such a program requirement would be entirely voluntary, it would have the benefit of 
rewarding farmers who undertake sound m
in
however, of reducing cost-effectiveness.  
 
Finally, state agencies could apply a performance requirement to all sources, including 
agriculture, and allow point sources and farmers the option of meeting the requirement though 
trading. Point and non-point sources would have access to the same pool of credits, and 
conservation subsidy funds could be applied as before to offset some part of farmers’ costs or 
the cost of operating the program. Farmers who had previously undertaken conservation 
practices would be in compliance and have no further obligation. Others who could make 
inexpensive reductions would do so and perhaps do more than their obl
w
purchase credits from point or non-point sources to meet their obligation. 
 
While trading has economic potential, there are some uncertainties associated with trading that 
need to be acknowledged and accounted for. The first and perhaps most important aspect of 
trading that would involve non-point sources is that there is a great deal of uncertainty involved 
because the loads are tied to weather events. While point sources produce fairly regular flows 
across seasons and even years, non-point sources do not. Loads are highest during rainy seasons 
and years with high precipitation, and conversely lower at other times. For this reason, a 
reduction in the load from non-point source may not be eq
T
improvements are realised and water quality goals are met. 
 
 
7 In Fertile Ground: Nutrient Trading’s Potential to Cost-Effectively Improve Water Quality, Paul Faeth, develops a 
framework to assess the cost-effectiveness of various policies and combinations of policies to reduce phosphorous 
loads in specific watersheds and argues that policy approaches incorporating nutrient trading programs are 
dramatically less expensive than conventional approaches and can achieve comparable benefits. In Growing Green: 
Enhancing the Economic and Environmental Performance of U.S. Agriculture, Faeth and the team he managed 
integrated voluminous amounts of data into an analytic framework that assessed the profitability and environmental 
impacts of alternative cropping systems. In Agricultural Policy and Sustainability: Case Studies from India, China, 
the Philippines, and the United States, Faeth and several co-authors found that farm policies are usually stacked 
against resource-conserving farming methods. 
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-ordinate the sale of credits and to verify them using standard 
chniques. For all these reasons, trading should occur within a regulatory program where rules 
and methods are standardised and appropriate review can be cost-effective, not permit-by-
idespread presence of agricultural subsidies in OECD countries is sufficient to show that 
markets are distorted. As such, first-best rules are no longer optimal and second-best rules, 
ich t distortions, are needed.    
e experience with pesticide taxes in OECD countries. Table 2 
mmarises these taxes. Table 3 shows estimates of the price elasticity of 'demand' for 
                                                
Another consideration is that trading programs can be expensive to put in place and operate if 
poorly designed. Regulatory paperwork, information gathering and the process of identifying 
partners to trade with can create transaction costs that are prohibitive and make a trading 
program ineffectual. Administrative oversight needs to be sufficient to ensure good 
performance, but not so burdensome as to inhibit trading. Registration of trades should be 
efficient so that, partners can easily hook up, report their trades, and get approval. When 
numerous non-point sources are involved, some sort of broker –for example, a co-operative - 
needs to be organised to co
te
permit, which is expensive.  
  
4.4 Some additional theoretical remarks 
 
Although we focus on incentives, the empirical literature has shown that there are instances in 
which standards might be preferred (e.g. Abrahams and Shortle, 2000). Briefly, these instances 
are: (1) cases of extremely hazardous pesticides with less risky substitutes; (2) cases when 
techniques exist that have the potential to yield significant environmental gains to farmers with 
little or no cost (e.g. use of septic systems for domestic wastewater treatment in rural areas; (3) 
cases in which a high degree of certainty over the level and geographical distribution of 
polluting inputs is desirable (e.g. pollutants for which damages are potentially large or 
irreversible, such as toxic substances). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that our analysis adopts 
the unrealistic assumption that agricultural commodity and input markets are not distorted. The 
w
wh ake into account the effects of policy designs on costs of market 
 
5  Experience with market-based approaches: pesticide taxes 
 
There is fairly extensiv
su
pesticides. Demand here is taken to refer to either the quantity of pesticides used or the 
frequency of their use8.  
 
The problems with designing pesticide taxes are several. First, Table 3 confirms the impression 
that the price elasticities of demand for pesticides are low9. Hence taxes will do little to reduce 
pesticide use unless they are set at very high rates (relative to the pesticide price). Both 
Norwegian and Swedish official reviews of effectiveness reached this conclusion, although both 
also agreed that it is difficult to disentangle tax effects from other policy effects (Andersen et al. 
2001). This suggests that the effectiveness of taxes rests on the uses of the tax revenues. The 
Danish experience suggests that recycling revenues back into agriculture severely reduces the 
effectiveness of the tax, and this explains the switch of policy in 1998 compared to the 1996 tax 
 
8 The two will tend to be related but some of the literature reports impacts on frequency of use and some of it on total 
quantity used. 
9 The exception appears to be Gren's analysis for Sweden (Gren, 1994) but she notes the fact that her estimates are 
higher than other Swedish studies. van den Bergh et al. (1997) report a high value for one of the studies they review 
but do not say which one it is. 
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e is partly a function of past 
pesticides releases. This will be especially true of water contamination by pesticides. If revenues 
can be hypothecated, they can be used for groundwater clean-up programmes, so that revenue-
raising taxes nonetheless have an externality reducing function.  
where revenues were return to agriculture as reductions in land taxation. Using revenues to 
further research or encourage changes in farming practice would appear to make more sense. 
Damage from pesticides is cumulative so that current damag
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Table 2  Pesticide taxes  
 
Country Year Tax rate Revenues Comment 
Denmark 1982 
 
1989 
 
 
1996 
 
 
 
1998 
20% P+T 
 
  3% P+T 
 
 
27% P+T 
13% P+T 
  3% P+T 
 
35% P+T 
25% P+T 
 
 
 
 
 
Recycled to reduce land taxes 
 
 
 
Recycled to organic farming 
+ pesticide reduction 
Pesticides in 
small volumes 
Pesticides 
 
 
Insecticides 
Herb/fungicides 
Preservatives 
 
Insecticides 
Herb/fungicides 
Finland 1988 
1998 
2.5% V 
3.0% V 
 To cover 
administration 
fees 
Iceland 1998 38 Є tonne   
Norway 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1996 
1998 
1999 
2.0% P 
3.0% P 
17.0% P 
19.0% P 
22.5% P 
24.5% P 
1.4 NOK/ ha 
0-150 
NOK/normal 
dose/ha 
 
NOK 20m 
Nearly all revenues recycled 
 
 
Tax + regulatory 
fee 
 
 
Regulatory fee 
Damage-varying 
tax 
Sweden 1984 
1988 
1994 
1986 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1992 
  4SK/kg/ai 
  8SK/kg/ai 
20SK/kg/ai 
29SK/ha/dose 
38SK/ha/dose 
46SK/ha/dose 
29SK/ha/dose 
  0SK/ha/dose
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory tax phased out 
Env'mental. Tax 
Env'mental. Tax 
Env'mental. Tax 
Regulatory tax 
Regulatory tax 
Regulatory tax 
Regulatory tax 
 
 
Source: adapted from Andersen et al. 2001. 
Notes: P = price, T = tax. Thus, 20% P+T means the tax was set at 20% of the tax-inclusive price, or 25% of the tax-
exclusive price. V is value added. NOK = Norwegian krone. Ai = active ingredient. SK = Swedish krone. Ha/dose = 
one normal dose per hectare = 'hectare dose'. 
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Table 3  Price elasticities of demand and use for pesticides 
 
Country Study Elasticity Comment 
 
Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
Meta-analysis 
 
 
UK 
 
 
 
 
France 
 
Netherlands 
 
Dubgaard  1987 
 
 
 
 
 
Rude 1992 
 
 
Jensen and Stryg 
1996 
 
Swedish Board of 
Agriculture 1992 
 
Gren 1994 
 
 
Van den Bergh et al. 
1997 
 
Bailey and 
Rapsomanikis 1999 
 
ECOTEC 1997 
 
Carpentier 1994 
 
Oskam 1995 (quoted) 
 
 
60% -> -21% F 
120% -> - 43% F 
-0.07 Q 
-0.61 Q 
-0.35 Q 
 
60% -> -13/-19% F 
120% -> -20/ -28%F 
 
-0.33 Q 
 
 
-0.20 to -0.50 Q 
 
 
-0.93 
-0.52 
-0.39 
-0.05 to - 1.53 
 
 
-0.39 
 
 
-0.55 to -0.711 
-0.28 to -0.452 
-0.30 
 
-0.12 
 
 
 
Herbicides/barley 
Fungicides/barley 
Fungicides/wheat 
 
Updates Dubgaard 
 
 
 
 
 
Herbicides 
 
 
Herbicides 
Insecticides 
Fungicides 
Various 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specialised arable 
farms 
 
 
Notes: elasticities are to be read as follows: 60% ->-21% F means that a 60% tax (% of pesticide price) gives rise to 
a 21% reduction in frequency of use. Q refers to quantity and the figure quoted is therefore a conventional price 
elasticity of demand. 1: estimating using ECOTEC methodology I. 2: estimate using ECOTEC methodology 2. 
 
 
Second, Table 2 shows that most taxes have been designed as percentage of pesticide prices. The 
risk here is that technological progress in pesticide manufacturing can give rise to price falls, and 
consequently absolute tax reductions, encouraging more pesticide use. Taxes per unit active 
ingredient can also fail to approximate differential environmental and health impacts (Dubgaard, 
1991; Archer and Shogren, 2001). The theoretical solution here is to express the tax as an 
absolute sum per unit of toxicity-weighted ingredient. Securing the toxicity weights is 
potentially feasible through the use of health-risk coefficients (Bolt, 2000) and health or 
ecological risk coefficients (Archer and Shogren, 2001). In practice, capturing the 'true' marginal 
damage from different forms of pesticide is complex due to other factors affecting damage - e.g. 
ground and weather conditions, ecosystem variation, and so on. But two studies suggest it is 
possible to secure estimates of differentiated tax rates. Bolt's study sets a tax equal to: 
 
 VP
kL
Ebt ..1.1.. ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=  
 
where b is a slope factor for a dose-response function linking exposure to chemicals to the 
probability of cancer; E is the estimated daily intake of an individual averaged over a lifetime of 
exposure; L is average lifetime; k is kilograms of pesticide use; P is population at risk and V is 
the monetary value of a statistical life. The resulting tax rates vary from 7 pence per kilo of 
Trifluralin to over £59 per kilogram for Amitraz. The most sophisticated toxicity-weighted tax 
study is that of Archer and Shogren (2001). They show results for a flat-rate tax for herbicides; a 
tax that is then differentiated by information about health risks from herbicides reaching water 
supplies; a tax that is even further differentiated according to the probabilities that herbicides 
will reach water supplies; and tax that is finally differentiated according to all these factors plus 
information about tillage practices. Unlike Bolt's study, however, there is no estimate of actual 
damage, so that the variation in tax rates is calibrated on a benchmark tax of $1 per (US) pound 
of one herbicide, Atrazine. However, the effects of the postulated taxes are shown in terms of 
monetary changes in farming returns per acre and in terms of changes in environmental 
indicators of water quality. This permits trade-offs to be shown between reduced net returns and 
improved environmental quality. 
 
Third, there are few examples of actual taxes being differentiated by toxicity. The Norwegian 
reforms of 1999 appear to come closest to this. Even though the overall demand for pesticides is 
not reduced significantly by a tax, a toxicity-differentiated tax may be effective if substitution 
between pesticides will occur in such a way that the overall toxic impact of pesticides will be 
reduced. In short, pesticide use and toxicity could be ‘decoupled’ by a pesticide tax. The 
problem with pesticide tax studies is that few of them simulate the ‘cross price effects’ of such a 
policy, i.e. they do not look closely at substitution between types of pesticides (or between 
pesticides and other inputs such as fertilisers and land). Bailey and Rapsomanikis (1999) 
simulate such a toxicity-weighted tax for the UK in the period 1992-1998. Overall price 
elasticity of demand for pesticides was consistently low and never greater than –0.39. However, 
cross price elasticities between the ‘banded’ pesticides (banded according to toxicity) were 
greater than the ‘own’ price elasticities, suggesting that farmers might switch between types of 
pesticide. But faced with a large tax on highly toxic pesticides, taxes on medium to low toxicity 
pesticides have a greater effect, suggesting that the high toxicity pesticides are more ‘necessary’ 
for agricultural production. A toxicity-weighted tax may not therefore achieve much by way of 
reduction in high toxicity pesticides. Moreover, Bailey and Rapsomanikis suggest that 
significant pesticides taxes could be welfare-reducing unless the size of the externality 
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associated with pesticides is above some 40,000 Euro per tonne. The only available estimate of 
damage based on a willingness to pay study, also for the UK, is of damage equal to 20,000 Euro 
per tonne (Foster et al, 1998), i.e. only half that required to justify a toxicity-weighted tax in 
economic terms. The importance of substitution to high-concentration low-dose pesticides is 
also stressed in Andersen et al. (2001) in evaluating the taxes in Finland and Norway. 
Substantial reductions occur in the tonnage of pesticides in both countries in response to various 
policy measures, including the taxes, but Andersen et al. doubt that this is associated with 
significant reductions in environmental and health damage. 
 
Three central conclusions can be derived from documented experience with pesticide taxes. 
First, that actual taxes may have had little impact on reducing pesticide damage, even if they 
have helped to reduce pesticide use. This is due to the low elasticities of demand and the 
behaviour of farmers in switching to low dose higher toxicity pesticides - i.e. it is important to 
know both overall price elasticities and cross elasticities of demand. Second, that toxicity-
weighted taxes can be computed. This is evidenced by the work of Bolt for the UK but 
especially so by the work of Archer and Shogren in the US. Fears that complex tax structures 
would be administratively difficult to operate may be well-founded but it would be useful to 
review the Norwegian experience following their switch to a toxicity-weighted tax structure in 
1999. Third, it is important to assess cross-elasticities as well as own price elasticities for 
aggregate pesticides or individual pesticide types. 
 
6  Experience with market-based approaches: fertiliser taxes 
 
Table 4 lists fertiliser taxes that are in place or which have been introduced in the recent past, 
while Table 5 reports estimates of fertiliser price elasticities. Fertiliser taxes should have two 
effects. First, fertilisers can be expected to be over-used due to risk aversion among farmers. 
This means that farmers will prefer to over-use fertiliser rather than under-use them, the latter 
option being associated with risks of unacceptable crop yield reductions. Hence a tax should 
reduce fertiliser use without giving rise to yield reductions, and especially so where other 
technologies are available for replacing artificial fertilisers (e.g. leguminous crops). Second, 
even if fertilisers are used optimally from the standpoint of the farmer's interests, crop yield 
reductions may be justified as the price to be paid for reducing environmental externalities.  
 
It is important to note that the Netherlands and Denmark are developing detailed 'mineral 
accounts' for each farm in the country. A mineral account records the application of nitrogen to 
soils through fertilisers and animal manure, the net take-up of nitrogen by crops, and hence the 
net excess balance. The net balance is effectively the run-off of nitrates from the farm. To a 
some  extent, then, the underlying problem of non-point pollution - namely the difficulty of 
allocating ambient pollution to sources - is overcome. 
 
Rougoor et al. (2001) analyse the effects of the taxes in Sweden, Austria and Finland. In the case 
of Austria, the levy is thought to have had a significant 'signalling' effect through raising 
awareness that fertilisers are environmentally damaging. In Sweden, it is estimated that the tax 
reduced demand for fertilisers in 1991-2 by 15-20%. Jonsson et al. (1997) estimate that the 
nitrogen tax reduced financially optimal dosages by about 10 per cent. They suggest indirect 
effects through the use of recycled revenues to fund research etc. was more significant. 
However, recycling of revenues ended in 1994 when the charge became an official 'tax'.  The 
Finnish experience is limited to a period of just two years since before 1992 the tax was set at a 
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very low level and it was abolished altogether in 1994. The effect in 1992 was significant but 
there was a growth in set-aside land at the same time. It is suggested by Rougoor et al. that the 
resulting net price elasticity was low at -0.11. However, this needs to be interpreted as a very 
short-run elasticity and long run elasticities would certainly have been higher. Hansen (1999) 
briefly evaluates the Danish experience and suggests the nitrogen tax (which covers fertilisers 
and manure) will help to solve regional nitrate problems, but that local problems will require 
more careful controls on animal stocking rates.  
 
The experience of those countries that have introduced fertiliser taxes is that they appear to have 
played some role in reducing fertiliser use10. However, the price elasticity estimates are low and 
this suggests comparatively little effect in terms of quantity reductions. There is some suggestion 
that revenue recycling may have been more effective, with revenues redirected to research and 
information.  
 
In terms of environmental effectiveness there is a problem similar to that for pesticides in terms 
of the tax being proportional to damage done. Whereas pesticides vary in their toxicity by design 
and also according to the conditions in the receiving environment, fertiliser damage tends to 
vary mainly because of the receiving environment conditions. On the face of it this suggests that 
flat rate fertiliser taxes should be more efficient than flat rate pesticide taxes which, as we have 
seen, need to be toxicity-weighted. Nonetheless, flat rate fertiliser taxes may still be inefficient. 
Brännlund and Kristrom (1999) simulate desirable fertiliser taxes for Sweden and show that the 
rates should vary regionally from 0.45 SK/kgN to 3.15 SK/kgN. Even this differentiation, they 
suggest, hardly captures the geographic variation in damages. Hence there is a problem of 
correctly targeting the tax. Brännlund and Kristrom's analysis appears to be the only one 
available making some allowance for differential ecological impact. In principle, however, it 
should be possible to differentiate a tax according to nitrate sensitivity indicators. The obvious 
problem is how the resulting arbitrage between regions would be avoided, i.e. fertilisers being 
bought in low tax areas and transported to high tax areas. 
 
10 On the comparative politics of introducing fertiliser taxes in Denmark and Sweden see Daugbjerg (2000). The 
former made several attempts prior to 1998 to introduce such a tax, without success. 
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Table 4  Fertiliser taxes 
 
Country Year of tax Tax rate Revenues Comments 
Austria 1986-1994 1986:Є0.25 kgN 
1988:Є0.35 kgN 
1991:Є0.47 kgN 
ASch 1 billion 
1991 
Used to subsidise 
grain exports. 
Abolished on 
entry to EU 
Norway 1988 1996: 
NOK1.2/kg/N 
NOK2.3/kg/P 
 
NOK 165m 1996  
Sweden11  1985 1985: Є0.12 kgN 
1986: Є0.14 kgN 
1987: Є0.16 kgN 
1988: Є0.20 kgN 
1991: Є0.24 kgN 
1992: Є0.27 kgN 
1993: Є0.07 kgN 
1995: Є0.20 kgN 
 
(1992: SK 
5kg/P) 
SK 300m 1996 Combined 
environmental 
and regulation 
tax, latter 
abolished in 
1992. 
Reclassified as a 
tax in 1994 
without revenue 
recycling 
 
 
Belgium 1991 Levied on N and 
P content of 
manure 
Є3.3 m 1993 Applies in 
Flemish part of 
Belgium 
Netherlands  <125kg/P/ha tax 
= 0 
125-200 kg/P/ha: 
tax = 0.25Gl/kg. 
>200 kg/P/ha tax 
= 0.50 Gl  
Gl 35m 1993 Based on P 
production per 
ha 
Denmark 1998 5 DK/kgN  Levied on 
'excess' N if 
mineral accounts 
kept. Otherwise 
on all N. N 
ceilings set by 
government 
Finland   1976 - 1994 1976-1992 small 
1992 Є0.44 kgN 
1990 Є0.25kgP 
 
Є 45 m 1994 Aimed at export 
subsidies. 
Abolished on 
entry to EU 
 
Sources: Nordic Council of Ministers (1996); Hansen (1999); OECD (1995);Rougoor et al. (2001); Brannlund and 
Gren (1999) 
                                                 
11 Detailed schedules of the Swedish taxes are given in Jonsson et al. (1997). 
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Table 5  Price elasticities for fertiliser demand 
 
Country Study Price elasticity Comment 
Austria 
 
Rougoor et al. 2001 
Becker 19921 
-0.20 
-0.29 
 
Sweden Drake 19912
Jonsson et al 1997 
Brännlund and Gren 
1999 
-0.17 to - 0.25 
-0.12 to - 0.51 
 
-0.12 to -0.51 
 
 
Range covers 
different regions 
Finland Bäckman 1997 -0.11 Very short run 
elasticity - see text 
Netherlands Oskam 1995 -0.43  
Various Burrell 1989 -0.10 to -1.10  
 
Notes: 1 in German, quoted in Rougoor et al. (2001). 2 in Swedish, quoted in Rougoor et al. (2001).  
 
 
7  Tax policies in the context of farm income support 
 
Most studies that evaluate the effectiveness of pesticide and nitrogen tax policies either say 
nothing about the farm income support context in agriculture, or assume it is given and that it 
has no interaction with tax measures. As such, they share the same problem noted earlier, 
namely that first-best policies are not feasible. An exception is Shortle and Laughland (1994) in 
the context of the USA. Their argument is that any tax would have implications for farm support 
policies - hence policy co-ordination would be needed between environmental tax and output 
subsidy measures. The net effects depend on the way any subsidies are adjusted as the tax is 
imposed. Adjustments might involve raising subsidies to compensate farmers, or the subsidy 
regime might be changed to one of lump sum transfers based on acreage. Dosi and Zeitouni 
(2000) similarly express the view that groundwater protection needs to be integrated into reform 
of the Common Agricultural Policy. The main message is that the net welfare effects of 
environmental taxes in the agricultural sector cannot be estimated properly without modelling 
the interactions between such measures and farm income support policy - a message about 
'joined up' government. 
 
8  Tradable permits in mineral surpluses 
 
Where mineral accounts exist - i.e. where it is possible to trace inputs and outputs of specific 
polluting minerals such as nitrogen - the conditions lend themselves to trading. The Netherlands 
permits trading in surplus animal manure. Farmers with below-limits manure allowances can 
sell to farmers already at the limit of their application rates. There is also very limited experience 
in the USA relating to point-non-point trading for phosphorus in certain States (Horan and 
Shortle, 2001; US EPA 2001). Schemes exist for the Tar Pimlico estuary in North Carolina, the 
Dillon Creek Reservoir in Colorado and Cherry Creek, Colorado. Young and Karkoski (2000) 
describe a scheme in the San Joaquin Valley, California where farmers trade land drainage 
allowances. However, in this particular case the amount of drainage load is monitorable due to 
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the prevailing system of pipes and canals. They note that the scheme was introduced in 1994 and 
that within five years pollution loads were substantially reduced. 
 
The obvious problem with trading regimes is what non-point sources would trade with point 
sources. The schemes in question involve point sources trading increased emissions with 
estimates of reduced loadings from agriculture. Agricultural sources enter the trade on a 
voluntary basis and with compensation for abatement efforts they can demonstrate they have 
made. In effect, then, monitorable emissions are traded for expected values of reduced loadings, 
the sources being stochastic. Trading therefore tends to take place on the basis of non-unitary 
ratios, i.e. one unit change in point emissions is traded for more than one unit expected value of 
non-point emissions. At the moment there appear to be no trading systems in which point source 
trade emissions with inputs (fertilisers, pesticides) to non-point sources. Shortle and Abler 
(1997) suggest that trading point emissions for non-point expected value emissions will be less 
efficient than trading point emissions for non-point emission reductions. 
 
US EPA (2001) expresses a mix of optimism and pessimism for future trading prospects in 
water loadings in general, the optimism being based on the potential for cost savings, the 
pessimism being based on the limited potential for trading if technology-based standards are 
already in place and the complexity of designing trading systems. 
 
9  Conclusions 
 
Both pesticide and fertiliser taxes could play some role in addressing the problem of non-point 
agricultural pollution in the UK. The main problems that need to be addressed can be 
summarized as follows. First, the low elasticities of demand for pesticides and fertilisers suggest 
that taxes will have little direct effect on reducing demand. This is of course a problem common 
to other UK environmental taxes such as the landfill tax and the aggregates tax. The experience 
of other countries suggests that such taxes may nonetheless have a 'signalling' effect in reducing 
demand, especially if farmers fear future rises. Possibly more important is the indirect effects of 
reducing demand via information and research activities financed by hypothecated taxes. In 
other words, there will be a high income effect which generates revenues that could be 
hypothecated to well-targeted environmental programmes.  
 
Second, the need, in both cases, to capture as far as possible the geographic and product 
variation in damage. For pesticides the product variation should be capable of being captured 
through toxicity weighted taxes, i.e. taxes would vary by commercial pesticide product. A single 
flat rate tax would appear to be inefficient, although it might be justified via its revenue raising 
effects. However, the limited work available suggests it is also very important to model cross-
substitution between pesticides which face different tax rates. Little information appears to be 
available on this issue but what there is, is instructive. Geographical variation in ecosystem 
sensitivity to pesticides is probably not capturable in a pesticide tax. This problem is common to 
fertiliser taxes: for fertilisers, the main cause of geographic variation in damage is ecosystem 
sensitivity. Beyond one experiment for Sweden, there appears to be no work comparable to that 
on pesticides which investigates the potential for geographically varying taxes. Since the tax is 
an input tax, any variation would in any event set up an arbitrage market, blunting the point of 
the tax. Hence a fertiliser tax would in all probability be blunter instrument than a toxicity-
differentiated pesticides tax. 
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Third, the extent to which, even if there are problems with these taxes, they perform better or 
worse than the alternatives. The main alternatives in the UK, and almost everywhere else, are 
some form of voluntary agreement and land zoning to cover application rates. Both can be 
judged inefficient and the theoretical literature suggests they are more inefficient than market-
based approaches. Fourth, the practical scope for taxes given that they would have to be 
superimposed on the increasingly complex legislative structures governing pesticides and, 
especially, nitrates. The issue is whether these instruments can induce 'beyond best practice' 
emissions. Finally, the possibility that some form of trading could take place with respect to 
manure loadings (and sewage sludge). A detailed life cycle assessment would be required to 
avoid a situation where one environment problem is resolved by trading at the expense of 
creating another problem. Trading regimes appear to exist in the Netherlands for surplus 
manure, but their effectiveness is not known. Trading nutrient loadings also exists in limited 
form in some states of the USA. 
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